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I. INTRODUCTION
The devastating impact of a plant closing or mass
fully felt in families and communities alike. Recovery
layoff is pain-
from the eco-
nomic and emotional upheaval is, at best, difficult. Congress addressed
these concerns in 1988 with the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN).' WARN was created to relieve some of the
pressures of short-notice layoffs and plant closings by providing work-
ers time to train for and find new jobs.' WARN requires employers to
give sixty days notice of plant closings or mass layoffs When em-
ployers fail to give the requisite notice, WARN provides a remedy in
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
2. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1994).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994).
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federal district court.4 Unfortunately, WARN does not specify a time
within which he suit must be brought. As a result, much litigation
under WARN concerns what statute of limitation should be used to
supplement WARN.'
In addressing the statute of limitation issue, courts across the na-
tion have used limitation periods from both state and federal statutes,
which range from six months' to six years.' Recently in North Star
Steel Co. v. Thomas,8 the United States Supreme Court gave guidance
on the appropriate statute of limitation to apply in WARN claims. In
Thomas, the majority held the limitation period should be borrowed
from an analogous state law that is not at odds with the purpose of
WARN, rather than from federal law.' This decision raises several
issues that will be discussed in this Note. First, this Note briefly dis-
cusses the background of WARN, the history of how courts supply
statutes of limitation to needy federal acts, and the cases preceding the
Thomas decision. Second, the Thomas decision itself is discussed.
Third, the potential problem of forum shopping 0 under Thomas is
4. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1994).
5. Accord United Mine Workers of Am. v. Peabody Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850 (6th Cir.
1994) (holding that the six-month statute of limitations from the NLRA applied to WARN
claims); Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding the
NLRA's six-month limitations period applied to WARN claims); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the most analogous
state statute of limitations should apply to WARN claims); United Paperworkers Int'l Union
Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard Inc., 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that Vermont's
six-year civil action statute of limitations applied to WARN claims); Automobile Mechanics'
Local No. 701 v. Santa Fe Terminal Servs., 830 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that
the NLRA's six-month limitations period did not apply to WARN claims); Wholesale &
Retail Food Distribution Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Servs., 826 F. Supp. 326 (C.D. Cal.
1993) (holding that the three-year California Code of Civil Procedure Section 338 statute of
limitations applied to WARN claims); Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192
(E.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that Michigan's six-year statute of limitations for breach of con-
tract applied to WARN claims); Newspaper & Mail Delivers' Union v. United Magazine
Co., 809 F. Supp. 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the six-month NLRA limitations peri-
od applied to WARN claims).
6. E.g., Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224 (5th Cir. 1994).
7. United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d
51 (2d Cir. 1993).
8. 838 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd, 35 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'd, 115
S. Ct. 1927 (1995).
9. Thomas, 115 S. Ct at 1931.
10. Forum shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a par-
ticular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or
1150 [Vol. 98:1149
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discussed. Finally, this Note proposes an appropriate statute of limi-
tation for West Virginia district courts to apply in WARN cases.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1988, Congress enacted WARN to protect workers, their fami-
lies, and communities from the economic and emotional stress that
accompanies unexpected plant closings and mass layoffs." To fully
understand the impact of this legislation, it is necessary to discuss
WARN in detail. To fully appreciate the effect of the Thomas decision,
this Note discusses the jurisprudence concerning the extra-legislative
supply of a statue of limitation to a federal act. Finally, the case law
preceding the United States Supreme Court decision in Thomas will be
briefly summarized.
A. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
With some exceptions," WARN prohibits employers 3 of 100 or
more employees from ordering a plant closing 4 or mass layoff 5 un-
verdict" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 452 (6th ed. 1991).
11. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1994).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(1994). An employer may order a plant closing or mass layoff
without the 60-day notice if: (1) it gives notice as soon as practicable and (2) the delay
was caused by: the inability to obtain needed capital or business, unforeseeable business
circumstances, or any form of natural disaster. Id.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1)(1994) (defining employer as:
"[A]ny business enterprise that employs-
(A) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or
03) 100 or more employees, who in the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per
week (exclusive of hours of overtime.")).
14. "[T'he term 'plant closing' means the permanent or temporary shutdown of a sin-
gle site of employment, or one or more facilities or operating units within a single site of
employment, if the shutdown results in an employment loss at the single site of employment
during any 30-day period for 50 or more employees excluding any part-time employees."
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2)(1994).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) (1994) (defining mass layoff as:
"[A] reduction in force which-
(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and
(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-
day period for-
(i)(1) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time employ-
ees); and
(II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or
11511996]
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til sixty days after the employer gives written notice of the order 6 to
all affected employees 7 or their representative." Employers violating
this mandate may be penalized in a civil action brought "in any district
court of the United States for any district in which the violation is
alleged to have occurred, or in which the employer transacts busi-
ness."' 9 Prevailing employees may be awarded back pay for each day
of the violation up to sixty days total.2" In certain circumstances, the
employer may also be liable to the local government for a WARN
violation.2'
There are several reasons for WARN's notification period. First,
the prescribed sixty days notice provides a transitional period in which
the affected parties can adjust to the prospective loss of employment.22
Thus, workers have time to find substitute employment, relieving some
of the tension associated with income loss.23 Additionally, workers
have time to enter skill training which would enable them to success-
fully compete in the job market.24 Finally, WARN ensures that relief
assistance will be promptly provided to the dislocated workers.2"
A shortcoming of WARN which has resulted in substantial litiga-
tion across the United States is the lack of a statute of limitation. The
(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees.")).
16. "An employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-
day period after the employer serves written notice of such an order-
(1) to each representative of the affected employees as of the time of the notice
or, if there is no such representative at that time, to each affected employee."
29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994).
17. "Mhe term 'affected employees' means employees who may reasonably be expect-
ed to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed plant closing or mass
layoff by their employer." 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5) (1994).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1) (1994).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1994).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1994).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3) (providing that:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 2102 of this title with
respect to a unit of local government shall be subject to a civil penalty of
not more than $500 for each day of such violation, except that such penalty
shall not apply if the employer pays to each aggrieved employee the amount
for which the employer is liable to that employee within 3 weeks from the
date the employer orders the shutdown or layoff.).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3) (1994).
25. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1994).
1152 [Vol. 98:1149
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resulting controversy surrounds whether state or federal law may sup-
ply the limitation period and how long it should be.
B. Filling the Gap: How Courts Select a Statute of Limitation
Prior to 1990, courts had to independently determine the appro-
priate statute of limitation for federal statutes that lacked their own.26
Traditionally, courts have looked to analogous state statutes to fill the
limitation period gaps in federal laws." The Supreme Court has cited
the Rules of Decision Act (RDA) as the original source of this doc-
trine.2" While the rationale has changed over the years, the doctrine
remains firmly entrenched.29
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters," the
Court created an exception which abrogated the traditional practice of
borrowing from state law first. The DelCostello Court held that federal
law may supply the limitation period when two conditions are met: (1)
"a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy
than available state statutes,"'" and (2) "the federal policies at stake
and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more
appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."32 When examining the
"practicalities of litigation," the Court will consider the hazards of
forum shopping and multiple characterizations of the claim.33 The
Court then evaluates whether a uniform statute of limitation would be
26. In 1990, Congress enacted a mandatory residual four-year statute of limitations for
any civil action arising under an Act of Congress that did not have its own limitations
period. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1990). Because WARN was enacted in 1988, this provision does
not apply.
27. E.g., Automobile Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04
(1966).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) ('The laws of the several states, except where the con-
stitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in
cases where they apply.").
29. Peter J. Mignone, Note, What Statute of Limitations Should Apply to the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1419, 1434 n.119
(1995).
30. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
31. Id. at 172.
32. Id
33. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 357
(1991).
11531996]
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more beneficial. 4 Thus, when filling a statute of limitation gap in a
federal law, courts may undergo the two-part DelCostello analysis or
resort to state law under the RDA. This disparity resulted in copious
litigation which the Supreme Court resolved in the Thomas decision. 5
C. A Difference of Opinion: Circuits Split on WARN's Limitation
Period
WARN's lack of a statute of limitation has spawned litigation in
District and Circuit courts across the United States. 6 The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was the first appellate court to address the issue.
In United Paperworkers International Union v. Specialty Paperboard,
Inc., the court held that WARN's statute of limitation should be bor-
rowed from Vermont's six year civil action statute rather than from
Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 8
This case arose out of a mass layoff at Specialty Paperboard In-
corporated (SPI). On March 15, 1991, SPI sold a paper mill to defen-
dant Rock-Tenn Company (RTC).39 On that day, SPI fired all 232
mill workers while RTC rehired 141 of these employees.40 On March
13, 1992, the union brought a class action under WARN against SPI
and RTC on behalf of the terminated employees.4' In its brief discus-
sion of WARN, the court noted that a mass layoff must last more than
six months to qualify as an employment loss. 42 Then, the court went
on to analyze the parties' proffered statute of limitation under the
DelCostello paradigm.
34. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987).
35. 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995).
36. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d
53 (3d Cir. 1994); Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224 (5th Cir. 1994); United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Peabody Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 1994); Automobile
Mechanics' Local 701 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. I11. 1993);
Wholesale & Retail Food Distribution Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Servs., 826 F. Supp.
326 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
37. 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1994).
39. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 52.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 52.
1154 [Vol. 98:1149
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For several reasons, the court found Vermont's civil action statute
of limitation more closely analogous to WARN than the NLRA limita-
tion period proposed by SPI. First, "[t]he purpose of WARN, unlike
that of the NLRA, is not to ensure labor peace but to alleviate, the
distress associated with job loss for both the workers and the commu-
nity in which they live."43 The NLRA is not concerned with the ef-
fects on the community, just the stability of bargaining relationships."
Second, the court found WARN's effect on collective bargaining to be
"tangential," thus making it a weak comparison to the NLRA."
WARN claims generally evolve after the employment relationship has
ended, thus having little to do with collective bargaining. 6 Finally,
due to the NLRA's extensive administrative structure, the court consid-
ered six months to be sufficient time for that type of claim to be
brought.47 Under the NLRA, unions typically handle the claims."
The National Labor Relations Board prosecutes the claims and could
not operate efficiently under differing statutes of limitation.49 WARN
claims, on the other hand, may be brought by non-unionized employees
on their own.5° WARN does not have an administrative structure that
protects displaced workers, as the claims are civil in nature."1 Thus,
the court held that the six-month NLRA limitation period was not
closely analogous to WARN to justify borrowing from federal law. 2
The Second Circuit went on to hold that Vermont's civil action
statute of limitation was closely analogous for three reasons. First, this
limitation period is used in wrongful discharge and workers compen-
sation benefits suits. 3 These actions "share . . . with a WARN claim
an interest in protecting workers from unexpected joblessness or loss of
hours." 4 Second, WARN, like promissory estoppel, alters at-will em-
ployment contracts by compensating workers for their reliance interests
43. Id. at 54.
44. Id.
45. Id at 55.
46. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 55.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 55.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 57.
53. Id.
54. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 57.
1996] 1155
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when they are unexpectedly discharged.5 Thus, the court held the
Vermont statute was more closely analogous to WARN than to the
NLRA. Continuing under the DelCostello analysis, the Second Circuit
found two reasons why WARN does not require a uniform federal
limitation period. 6 First, WARN is not subject to multiple character-
izations." It gives rise to only one type of claim, failure to give stat-
utorily mandated notification for set monetary damages.58 Second,
WARN claims are not multi-state in nature because they typically deal
with a single plant site.59 According to the court the venue is limited
to either the district where the violation allegedly occurred or where
the employer does business.6" Thus, unless the plant straddles two
states, the opportunity to forum shop for a longer limitation period is
minimal.6" For these reasons, the Second Circuit found Vermont's
statute of limitation appropriate for WARN claims.
Following the Second Circuit's decision in Specialty Paperboard,
WARN statute of limitation issues began filtering into other circuits.
The Third Circuit, in United Steelworkers of America v. Crown Cork &
Seal Co.,62 was the next circuit court to render a decision on this is-
sue. This case was subsequently consolidated with Thomas v. North
Star Steel Co.63 and appealed to the Supreme Court. Thomas will be
discussed in Part III.
In close succession, the Fifth Circuit' also considered the appro-
priate statute of limitation for WARN claims. In Halkias, a consolidat-
ed Fifth Circuit case, the court held that the six-month NLRA statute
of limitation was appropriate for WARN claims.65 General Dynamics
instituted a three-state mass layoff on January 8, 1991.66 On Novem-
ber 24, 1992, the workers in Texas and Oklahoma filed a WARN
55. IA
56. Id at 56.
57. Id.
58. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id
62. 32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 1994).
63. 838 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. Pa. 1993).
64. Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224 (5th Cir. 1994).
65. Id. at 226.
66. Id. at 227.
1156 [Vol. 98:1149
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claim.67 Similarly, workers laid off by Glastron, Inc. between October
and December 1990 filed their WARN suit on December 17, 1992.68
After a brief discussion of WARN, the Fifth Circuit applied the
DelCostello analysis.
The Halkias court found that the six-month NLRA limitation peri-
od was more closely analogous to WARN than any state law.69 First,
the court noted a trend of using federal limitation periods to supple-
ment federal acts.7° This rule affords increased predictability and
minimization of litigation.7' The court also found WARN and the
NLRA closely analogous in purpose. When promulgating WARN, the
Department of Labor borrowed heavily from the NLRA.' Additional-
ly, courts have used NLRA case law to interpret WARN's provi-
sions.73 Furthermore WARN and the NLRA are inextricably interre-
lated. The NLRA has been interpreted to require employers to give
notice to employees of plant closings and layoffs.74 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that WARN sets the time limits for the NLRA's notice re-
quirements.75 Thus, a failure to give WARN's notice could create a
concurrent claim under the NLRA.76 The court reasoned that because
NLRA claims must be brought within a six-month time frame the same
should apply to WARN. Finally, the six-month statute of limitation "is
consistent with federal law's preference for rapidity in resolving labor
disputes." 77
The Fifth Circuit held that none of the proffered state statutes of
limitation provided a "closer fit" to WARN than the NLRA. 78 The
court compared WARN to a tort for conversion of an employee's right
67. Workers from the third state, Missouri, had filed their WARN claim within ten
days of the layoff. Id.
68. Id. at 227.
69. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 234.
70. Id. at 229.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 231.
73. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 232.
74. See, e.g., Metropolitan Teletronics Corp., 279 N.L.R.B. 957, 958-59 & n.14 (1986)
(finding a NLRA violation for the employer's failure to notify the union of its decision to
close and relocate plant).
75. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 232.
76. Id. at 233.
77. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 234.
78. Id.
19961 1157
9
Goddard: North Star Steel Company v. Thomas: Time for Warning
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
to continued employment.79 But because Texas is an at-will employ-
ment state, the two-year tort statute would be inappropriate." Also,
Texas' four-year residual statute was not more closely analogous sim-
ply because it was a "fallback position."'" The court also found the
four-year breach of contract statute of limitation, while acceptable to
the Second Circuit in Specialty Paperboard,2 was not workable in
Texas under that court's reasoning.83 This period worked in the Sec-
ond Circuit because it governed both workers' compensation claims
and wrongful discharge claims in Vermont. 4 The court noted that
these claims in Texas are governed by two different limitation periods,
so this option fails too.85
The Fifth Circuit went on to apply the second part of the
DelCostello analysis. Initially, the court found that WARN's venue
provision, Section 2104(a)(5), created forum shopping. 6 Because
WARN raises a federal question, the district courts must use federal
choice of law rules.87 Thus, if a claim is brought in a forum other
than where the injury occurred, that court may utilize its own state's
statute of limitation, as a surrogate for the federal common law.88 The
result is that litigants may forum shop for a more beneficial limitation
period. 9 The court went on to note that judicial resources could be
preserved by using a uniform period.9"
Next, the court found that "federal labor policy has long favored
the rapid settlement of disputes between an employer and an employ-
ee."'91 An extended limitation period may create problems of evidence
availability, especially if the plant has permanently closed.92 The court
also noted that the six-month period had been successfully met by
79. Id. at 235.
80. Id.
81. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 235.
82. 999 F.2d 51 (1993).
83. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 235.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 236.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 237.
89. Id.
90. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 237.
91. Id. at 238.
92. Id.
[Vol. 98:11491158
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workers in the past.93 Further, the court felt the simplicity of the
WARN claim allowed for the lack of a complex administrative struc-
ture.94
Finally, the court found that a longer statute of limitation went
against WARN's purpose.95 WARN provides notice so that workers
may quickly enter job training and find new jobs.96 "Obviously, pro-
viding funds to workers several years after their termination does not
serve that objective." 97 For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit applied the
six-month NLRA limitation period.
The Sixth Circuit considered the WARN statute of limitation ques-
tion in United Mineworkers of America v. Peabody Coal Co.9' The
Sixth Circuit, like the Fifth, held that the six-month limitation period
from Section 10(b) of the NLRA should apply to WARN claims.99
After examining the case law on the issue, the court found that the
NLRA provided a closer analogy to WARN than any state statutes of
limitation.' Both acts have provisions covering employer's failure to
give notice of plant closings and mass layoffs.' Both offer protec-
tion to workers as well as their communities. I 2 Additionally, the
court held that the six-month period advanced WARN's policies more
than the proffered five year catch-all provision. 3 The court found
the congressional intent of WARN to be the provision of short-term
relief to the workers, their families, and their communities.' 4 Pro-
longing the period would not start "employees on the road to retraining
and reemployment before unemployment becomes a problem."'0 5 Fur-
thermore, the court noted the concern for forum shopping. A single
93. For example, the Missouri workers laid off by General Dynamics brought suit
within ten days of the violation. Id.
94. Halkias, 31 F.3d at 238.
95. Id. at 239.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 38 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 1994).
99. Id. at 851.
100. Id. at 855.
101. Id. at 856.
102. For example, the NLRA proscribes practices "which affect commerce and are inim-
ical to the general welfare." Peabody Coal, 38 F.3d at 856.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
1996] 1159
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violation of WARN, resulting in plant closings or mass layoffs in sev-
eral states, would permit workers to shop forums for the longest limita-
tion period."' Additionally, the shear volume of possible analogous
state statutes would seriously burden the judicial system with extrane-
ous litigation." 7 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that the six-month
NLRA limitation period applied to WARN claims. '
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas ' was a consolidated case from
the Third Circuit." 0 In the first case, the United Steelworkers of
America brought a WARN claim against Crown Cork & Seal Compa-
ny, Inc.' 1 Ordering a reduction-in-force and shutdown of one of its
plants, the company terminated eighty-five employees without no-
tice.112 One year later, the Steelworkers sought relief under WARN in
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District Court of Pennsylva-
nia."3 Urging the court to apply the six-month limitation period from
the NLRA, Crown Cork made a motion for summary judgment, claim-
ing the statute of limitation had run.114 The district court held that
state law controlled and thus the Steelworkers had met all of the argu-
ably applicable limitation periods borrowed from analogous Pennsylva-
nia state law. 5
In the second case, non-unionized employees of North Star brought
a WARN claim in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania."6 Applying the six-month limitation period from the
NLRA, the district court granted North Star's motion for summary
judgment, because the limitation period had lapsed by approximately
106. Peabody Coal, 38 F.3d at 855.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 856.
109. 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995).
110. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir.
1994).
111. United Steelvorkers of Am. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 833 F. Supp. 467 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).
112. Id at 467-68.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 468.
115. Crown Cork, 833 F. Supp. at 469.
116. North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 838 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. Pa. 1993).
[Vol. 98:11491160
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two weeks."7 The district court reasoned that the NLRA was more
analogous to WARN than anything in Pennsylvania law; therefore, its
limitation period should apply."'
Consolidating these two cases, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the WARN limitation period should be borrowed from state
law, not federal." 9  The Third Circuit utilized the two-part
DelCostello analysis.' Applying part one, the court held that the
NLRA was not so closely analogous to WARN that the traditional
policy of borrowing from state law first could be overridden.' For
instance, the acts differed in their purpose.'22 The NLRA focuses on
the importance and integrity of the collective bargaining process.'
WARN, however, has little to do with collective bargaining.'24 Fur-
ther, WARN applies to unionized and non-unionized workers alike.'25
In addition, the remedies afforded under the two acts differ widely. 26
The NLRA offers equitable relief, like reinstatement,'27 while WARN
offers only back pay and benefits.'
Under the second part of the DelCostello analysis the court con-
cluded that the NLRA six-month limitation period was inappropri-
ate.'29 A uniform federal limitation period was unnecessary because
WARN does not contain multiple claims and legal theories.'
"WARN contains but a single cause of action, and all WARN claims
involve nearly identical fact patterns and discrete inquiries..'' More-
over, WARN does not implicate geographic concerns because the yen-
117. Id. at 975.
118. Id. at 974.
119. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d 53, 61 (3d Cir.
1994).
120. Id. at 57.
121. Id. at 59.
122. Id. at 58.
123. Crown Cork, 32 F.3d at 57.
124. Id. at 58.
125. Id. at 58.
126. Id at 59.
127. See Tubari Ltd., Inc. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1992).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1) (1994).
129. Crown Cork, 32 F.3d at 61.
130. Id at 60.
131. Id.
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ue is strictly limited.' The court concluded that the six-month limi-
tation period was too short given the lack of administrative structure
under WARN.'33 On the other hand, the suggested state statutes were
not "so short as to interfere with a worker's potential for seeking or
gaining relief."'3 Thus, the court affirtmed the decision in Crown
Cork and reversed North Star, while refusing to pick the particular
Pennsylvania statute to apply.'35
IV. THE DECISION
In Thomas, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether
WARN should be supplemented with a state limitation period or with
one borrowed from the NLRA"36 The Thomas Court held the statute
of limitation for WARN should be borrowed from the most analogous
state law that does not frustrate WARN's purpose, thus affirming the
Third Circuit's judgment.' Justice Souter delivered the opinion of
the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice
O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsberg, and
Justice Breyer. Justice Scalia filed a brief concurrence in the judgment.
A. Closing the Gap: The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion first delved into the Court's historical prac-
tice for federal statutes which fail to prescribe a limitation period.
Broadly stated, state law is always "the lender of first resort."'3 Be-
cause this rule was longstanding, the Court reasoned Congress would
know of this practice and expect the Court to interpret WARN accord-
ingly.'39 Additionally, the majority recognized a narrow exception to
the general rule: Congress would not want a limitation period that
132. Crown Cork, 32 F.3d at 60.
133. Id. at 60-61.
134. Possible state limitation periods include the two-year period for enforcing civil
remedies, the three-year period from the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Act, the
four-year period for breach of an implied contract, and the six-year residual statute of limi-
tation. Id. at 61.
135. Id.
136. 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995).
137. Id. at 1931-32.
138. Id. at 1930.
139. Id. at 1930.
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would be "at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive
law."'40 Therefore, in limited circumstances, federal law should be the
statute of limitation source. 4' Specifically, state law will not supply
the limitation period "only 'when a rule from elsewhere in federal law
clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when
the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that
rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmak-
ing.'''142
The Supreme Court held that WARN fell within the traditional
state law borrowing doctrine.'43Looking at the four state statutes of
limitation identified by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,' 4  the ma-
jority determined that any of them could apply. 4  The Court con-
cluded that none of these statutes would frustrate WARN's purpose and
the complaints were timely under any of these statutes.146 According
to the majority, the shortest of these periods, two years, was not so
brief as to hinder an employee from bringing a claim..147 Compara-
tively, the longest of these periods, six years, was not so long as to
frustrate the legislature's interest in the rapid disposition of labor dis-
putes.' 48
The Court went on to dismiss the petitioners' arguments that uti-
lizing state law would encourage forum shopping. 149 The petitioners
urged the Court to adopt the NLRA's six-month statute of limitation as
the uniform rule for the country. 5 ° Otherwise, it argued, employees
would search for the district with the longest limitation period in which
the employer transacts business. 5' The Court brushed this argument
aside stating, "these are just the costs of the rule itself, and nothing
about WARN makes them exorbitant.' 52  The Court further deemed
140. Thomas, 115 S. Ct at 1930.
141. Id. at 1931.
142. Id. (citing DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983)).
143. Id.
144. See supra note 133 and accompanying text
145. Thomas, 115 S. Ct at 1931.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Thomas, 115 S. Ct at 1931.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1932.
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a uniform rule unnecessary because WARN claims commonly relate to
a single site."' In conclusion, the Court affirmed the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals.
5 4
B. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority's view that state law is the
lender of first choice.'55 He disagreed, however, with the majority's
position on the DelCostello exception to the rule.'56 Justice Scalia as-
serted that when a state statute of limitation "would frustrate the pur-
poses of the federal enactment, no limitation period at all [should be
applied]."'57
Justice Scalia found the DelCostello analysis unworkable for two
reasons. 5 First, the "closer analogy" element results in federal law
applying in some states but not in others.'59 Thus, some states would
have statutes so closely analogous to WARN that they could apply;
while others would have to resort to federal law as a supplement. 6
Second, the "significantly more appropriate [vehicle for interstitial
lawmaking]" test is meaningless because a uniform limitation period
for a federal statute would always be significantly more appropri-
ate. " Despite this, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. He con-
cluded that the statutes of limitation under consideration were not at
odds with WARN's purpose, and the complaints were timely under all
of them.'62 If the statutes had frustrated WARN's purpose, he would
not apply a limitation period to the claim.'
153. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. at 1932; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2)-(3) (1994).
154. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. at 1932.
155. Id.
156. Id
157. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. at 1932 (Scalia, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id
161. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. at 1932 (Scalia, J., concurring).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
As a result of the Thomas decision, courts will face new questions.
The first question concerns the magnitude of the risk of forum shop-
ping. Courts have disagreed on how much leeway WARN's venue
provision gives plaintiffs when selecting their forum. The second ques-
tion courts will face is which state law should apply. A few courts
have reached decisions on this issue." 4 Neither of the federal district
courts in West Virginia nor the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
addressed this issue.'65 The final part of this Note sets forth the prop-
osition that the federal district courts in West Virginia should select the
five-year contract statute of limitation from the Wage Payment and
Collection Act'66(WPCA) to apply in West Virginia WARN cases.
A. Born to Shop: Forum Shopping Under Thomas
According to the Supreme Court in Thomas, WARN's statute of
limitation should be supplied by the most analogous state law that is
not at odds with WARN's purpose.'67 Thomas requires a two-step
analytical process for determining what limitation period applies. First,
as many employers do business in several states, the court must deter-
mine which state will supply the law.'68 Second, the court must de-
termine the most analogous state law in consonance with WARN's
legislative purpose.'69 Applying the first step may result in forum
shopping. Regardless, multi-state employers should understand the sig-
nificance of these risks even if they cannot be guarded against.
WARN provides that claims may be brought "in any district court
of the United States for any district in which the violation is alleged to
164. States with multiple districts may face an additional problem. For example, courts
in the northern and western districts of Texas are grappling over which Texas law should
supply WARN's limitation period. The northern district has selected the four-year period for
debt actions. The western district selected the six-month Wage Payment Law statute of limi-
tation. Individual Employment Rights Newsletter, Vol. 11, No. 1, Nov. 7, 1995, p. 1.
165. Prior to publication, the Northern District of West Virginia decided this issue in
Bell v. Philips Elecs., 897 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. W. Va. 1995). This case is discussed in
subsection B.
166. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1 to -18 (1989).
167. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. at 1931.
168. See id. at 1931.
169. See id.
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have occurred, or in which the employer transacts business."' ° As
previously mentioned, this opens up the possibility of forum shopping.
Some district courts believe the advantages of forum shopping are
minimal.171 These courts assert that WARN claims are not multi-state
in nature because they relate to a single site. The fact that claimants
are not limited to suing in the district court where the site is located is
irrelevant, because choice of law rules would require the law of the
site be used.'72  Other courts and commentators have found holes in
this line of reasoning. When a federal court determines which state's
law should apply, it may use one of three methods:'73
1) Borrow a statute of limitation from the state in which the
court sits. 74
2) Follow the forum state's conflict of laws rules, if the case
is based upon diversity. 75
3) Follow the federal common law choice of law rules, if the
case is a federal question case.'76
The Fifth Circuit noted that any one of these methods may be em-
ployed, with varying results.'77 Because WARN is a federal question,
some courts may apply federal common law choice of law rules.'
Other courts, however, may decide to use their state's choice of law
principles as a "surrogate" for the federal common law because they
consider statute of limitation considerations to be procedural.'79 While
state law is used to supplement WARN under each approach, the law
170. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1994).
171. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d
51, 56 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that forum shopping advantages are minimal because WARN
claims are limited to a single site); Automobile Mechanics' Local v. Santa Fe Terminal
Serv., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 432, 436 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that WARN claims are limited
to a single site and choice of law rules would require the law of the site be borrowed).
172. See supra note 170. For example, the Second Circuit stated that unless the site
straddled state boundaries, there would be no doubt as to which state's laws to use.
173. Peter J. Mignone, Note, What Statute of Limitations Should Apply to the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act?, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1419, 1430 (1995).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. ld.
177. Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, 237 (5th Cir. 1994).
178. 1d. at 236.
179. Id. at 237.
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the court applies depends on where the plaintiff brings the claim. 8 °
As a result, federal courts may apply different limitation periods to
different claims arising from a single WARN violation.'
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit enumerated the potential number of
forums that may hear claims from a single WARN violation, stating:
First, . . . a single decision can result in plant closings in several states,
any one of which could provide the forum for suit. The state in which the
closing decision was made can provide yet another forum. Second, the
company that closes several plants in several states can be sued in those
several states and thus be subject to several different statutes of limitation
for the same, single federal violation. Third, the parties and the courts
could face potentially daunting choice of law problems arising from claims
brought in several different states as a result of forum shopping. Finally,
given the authorization in WARN to bring suit in any federal district 'in
which the employer transacts business,' 29 U.S.C. Section 2104(a)(5),
including districts other than where a plant is closed or the plant closing
decision was made, the opportunity for forum shopping in today's national
and international corporate environment appears limitless."'
As plaintiffs are not required to sue as a class, multi-state employ-
ers may face several limitation periods for one WARN violation. Thus,
courts should be sensitive to the employer's vulnerability resulting from
the Thomas decision. One helpful way to achieve greater predictability
is for courts to apply a common state statute of limitation to all
WARN claims.
180. See id.
181. For example, the Halkias case involved workers from three different states suing
on the same mass layoff. Each state may choose its own statute to supply the limitations
period, creating substantial hardship on the employer. Thus, under this premise, results will
vary within each district. 31 F.3d at 237.
182. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Peabody Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850, 855 (6th Cir.
1994).
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B. A WARNing to West Virginia Employers: Which Law Should Apply
Neither the northern..3 nor the southern district courts of West
Virginia have considered which state law is most analogous to WARN.
This Note proposes that the district courts should select the five-year
contract statute of limitation"' used by the WPCA.8 5
The WPCA is the West Virginia statute most analogous to WARN.
It sets out when payments must be made to employees who are dis-
charged"8 6 or laid off.'87 These are the same employees protected
under WARN.' Additionally, if payments are not made within the
prescribed time periods, workers may bring an action to recover wag-
es,189  benefits, 9  liquidated damages, 9' and reasonable attorney
fees.' This recovery package is much like WARN's provisions pro-
183. Prior to publication, the Northern District rendered an opinion on this issue in Bell
v. Philips Elecs., 897 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. W. Va. 1995). This case will be addressed at the
end of part VI.
184. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6 (1994).
185. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1 to -18 (1989).
186. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(b) ("[V]henever a person, firm or corporation discharges
an employee, such person, firm or corporation shall pay the employee's wages in full within
seventy-two hours").
187. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(d) (providing that:
When work of any employee is suspended as a result of a labor dispute, or when
an employee for any reason whatsoever is laid off, the person, firm or corporation
shall pay in full to such employee not later than the next regular payday, either
through the regular pay channels or by mail if requested by the employee, wages
earned at the time of suspension or layoff.)
188. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5).
189. W. VA. CODE § 21-5C-8(d) ("In any such action the amount recoverable shall be
limited to such unpaid wages as should have been paid by the employer within two years
next preceding the commencement of such action.").
190. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(c) ("The term 'wages' means compensation for labor or
services rendered by an employee, . . . [and] shall also include then accrued fringe benefits
capable of calculation and payable directly to an employee.").
191. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(e) (providing that:
If a person, finn or corporation fails to pay an employee wages as required under
this section, such person, firm or corporation shall, in addition to the amount due,
be liable to the employee for liquidated damages in the amount of wages at his
regular rate for each day the employer is in default, until he is paid in full, with-
out rendering any service therefor.).
192. W. VA. CODE § 21-5C-8(c) ("The court in any action brought under this article
may, in the event that any judgment is awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, assess costs of
the action, including reasonable attorney fees against the defendant.").
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viding aggrieved employees with backpay, 93 benefits19 , and reason-
able attorney fees."'
Initially, the West Virginia Legislature did not supply the WPCA
with a statute of limitation. The West Virginia Supreme Court ad-
dressed this omission in Lucas v. Moore.'96 The court premised its
application of the five-year contract statute of limitation to the WPCA
on an implied employment contract.'97 The court held that the effect
of the WPCA is to make a "fictitious" additional thirty days of em-
ployment.'98 Thus, application of the five-year contract limitation pe-
riod from Section 55-2-6 of the West Virginia Code was appropri-
ate.'99 Similarly, WARN creates a "fictitious" additional sixty days of
employment upon which the worker may collect backpay and bene-
fits.200 These wages are computed based upon the original employ-
ment contract.2"' The West Virginia Supreme Court found the inextri-
cable relationship between the WPCA and the employment contract
particularly relevant when considering which statute of limitation
should apply to the WPCA. °2 The District Courts may use this rea-
soning when determining which West Virginia law should supplement
WARN.
Other courts have found contract statute of limitation appropriate
supplements for WARN.2 3 In Wallace, the Federal District Court for
193. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(A) (1994).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(B) (1994).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(6) (1994) ("In any such suit, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.").
196. 303 S.E.2d 739 (WV. Va. 1983).
197. Western v. Buffalo Mining Co., 251 S.E.2d 501, 503 (W. Va. 1979).
198. Lucas, 303 S.E.2d at 741.
199. Id.
200. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1994).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1994) (providing that:
Any employer who orders a plant closing or mass layoff in violation of
§ 2102 of this title shall be liable to each aggrieved employee who suffers
an employment loss as a result of such closing or layoff for-
(A) back pay for each day of violation at a rate of compensation not less
than the higher of-
(i) the average regular rate received by such employee during the last 3
years of the employee's employment; or
(ii) the fmal regular rate received by such employee.).
202. Lucas, 303 S.E.2d at 741.
203. See, e.g., Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 764 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
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the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that Michigan's six-year
breach of contract statute of limitation applied in WARN actions." 4
The court's "focal point" in deciding this issue was the type of interest
harmed: °.
The type of interest harmed in the instant suits is contractual. When an
employer unilaterally and radically changes an employee's terms of em-
ployment without notice and the employee is suddenly discharged from
employment, he essentially is breaching that worker's employment contract.
Furthermore, the damages under the Act [WARN] are the pay and benefits
for each day of violation up to a maximum of 60 days. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2104(a). Obviously, such damages will be calculated by looking to the
collective bargaining agreements for union workers and to the explicit and
implied employment contracts for non-union employees.1
6
The Tenth Circuit also held that borrowing a contract statute of
limitation for WARN was a sound decision.2 7 The Frymire court
supported this conclusion for several reasons. First, the court felt that
uniformity was enhanced when a nationally recognized claim, like one
in contract, supplied the limitation period.0 ' Second, the court be-
lieved WARN imposed "a federal mandate upon employers that effec-
tively obligates them as if bound by the terms of an employment con-
tract."20 9 Third, WARN's remedy of back pay is very similar to the
remedy for breach of an implied contract 0 Finally, the court found
a contract limitation period appropriate because other courts had used it
as well.2 '
The final reason West Virginia should adopt the five-year contract
limitation period from the WPCA is that it is well within the two- to
Colorado's three-year contract statute of limitations applied in WARN claims); United
Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51, 56-57 (2d
Cir. 1993) (holding Vermont's six-year contract statute of limitations applied in WARN
claims); Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192, 196 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
204. Wallace, 818 F. Supp. at 196.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 196-97.
207. Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757 (10th Cir. 1995).
208. Id. at 764.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 764 (noting that the Second Circuit in Specialty Paperboard
applied a contract limitations period and the Supreme Court in Thomas found Pennsylvania's
contract statute of limitations acceptable).
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six-year range deemed acceptable by the Supreme Court in Thom-
as.2 12 For these reasons, the West Virginia district courts should apply
the five-year contract statute of limitation used by the WPCA.
Prior to the publication of this note, the Northern District of West
Virginia decided which state statute should supply WARN's limitation
period in Bell v. Philips Electronics.213 The defendant company laid
off seventy-two workers at its Fairmont, West Virginia plant on Octo-
ber 22, 1990.214 The plaintiffs brought suit over two years later. Ar-
guing the two-year personal injury limitation period should apply, the
defendant moved to dismiss the claim as time-barred.215 Plaintiffs,
however, argued that the five-year contract limitation period used by
the WPCA should apply to WARN actions; and thus, the claim was
timely. 6
The court held that the reasoning in Lucas v. Moore. 7 applied to
WARN claims for several reasons. First, both WARN and the WPCA
create "fictitious additional periods of employment" and offer the same
remedies and wages.2"8 Second, the court found that both created
rights that would not exist unless the employer violated the "legisla-
tively determined standards to ease the financial burden on terminated
employees. 21 9 Finally, the court found that this determination was
consistent with the practices in other jurisdictions, as this Note also
stated.22" Based on these reasons, the northern district held that the
five-year contract limitation period from the WPCA was applicable to
221WARN actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Thomas, the Supreme Court held that WARN's statute of limi-
tation should be supplied by the most analogous state law, not -at odds
212. 115 S. Ct at 1931.
213. 897 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. W. Va. 1995).
214. Id. at 939.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See supra note 197 and accompanying text
218. Bell, 897 F. Supp. at 940.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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with WARN's purpose, rather than federal law. This decision requires
courts to approach WARN claims with a two-step analysis. First, the
court must determine which state's law should apply. This question
may implicate some complex choice of law decisions for the district
courts. As a result, forum shopping by aggrieved workers becomes a
potential problem for abuse. Second, the court must sift through nu-
merous state statutes to find one closely analogous to WARN. This
substantial chore may result in generic catchall periods being used,
rather than truly analogous laws. Thus, if the court could pick a com-
mon state statute to apply, like a contract statute of limitation, predict-
ability would be enhanced and excessive litigation could be avoided
when courts address WARN claims.
Vanessa Zyla Goddard
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